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*S*TEPSON OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT: THE DUC DU CHÂTELET, THE COLONEL WHO “CAUSED” THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Ken Alder

Shortly after the fall of the Bastille contemporaries began to describe the changes underway in France as a revolution. As they looked back, those in the patriot camp could cite many to whom credit was due for their achievements. But in the dispirited royalist camp there was one man in particular whom many singled out for blame. According to contemporaries, Florent-Louis-Marie, duc Du Châtelet-Lomont, colonel of the French Guards, was the man most responsible for having “caused” the French Revolution. Appointed in November 1788 to this sensitive post—the French Guards were responsible for policing the city of Paris—Colonel Du Châtelet had so bungled his command at this critical juncture (or so the story went) that he had lost the city of Paris for the king. He had done so by offending his noble officers, alienating his experienced sergeants, and so infuriating the main body of troops that they defected to the side of the populace and contributed to the taking of the Bastille. As the pro-royalist journalist, Montejoye, noted in 1791: “There is no doubt that the defection of the French Guards must be attributed principally to their colonel, who may be said to have, more than anyone else in France, forwarded and caused the revolution.”¹

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Accusatory fingers had been pointed at the colonel even before the fortress fell. On 23 June 1789, the English traveler, Arthur Young, noted in his diary that Du Châtelet's "treatment, conduct and maneuvers . . . had disgusted" many of his troops. "If an order is given to the French Guards to fire on the people," he predicted, "they will refuse obedience." The bookseller Hardy observed the growing desertions of the Guards and concluded they had decided to no longer serve as the "instrument" of their colonel. And Ambassador Thomas Jefferson reported on a rumor that the troops were dissatisfied with their commander. The events of July 1789 greatly amplified these allegations. In 1795, Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan, the self-styled "Montesquieu of the French Revolution," was still mulling over "the fatal influence of [Du Châtelet] in the terrible circumstances at issue." And even at the distance of 1838, a former colleague of Du Châtelet still felt it necessary to deny the duke's responsibility for having caused the French Revolution.²

Of course, this accusation, in all its specificity, is absurd; one colonel does not a revolution make. Just as one Bastille does not a French Revolution make. Yet we may still wonder: who was this Du Châtelet and what did he do to so alienate the troops? Our curiosity should be further piqued when we learn that he was the son of the savant, Emilie Du Châtelet (also famous as Voltaire's mistress) and that his childhood was associated with some of the most illustrious names of the High Enlightenment. More to the point, Du Châtelet, throughout his career, was closely associated with the attempt to reform the French army in line with Enlightenment principles—or at least in line with that stepson version of the Enlightenment which Foucault has called the "other Enlightenment."³ By this phrase, the "other" Enlightenment, Foucault meant to distinguish the disciplinary Enlightenment of penal institutions from the humanist Enlightenment of the jurists—while acknowledging their close family connection. In this paper, I use the strange circumstances of Du Châtelet's career to spy into the elusive relationship between this "other" Enlightenment and the French Revolution. In doing so, I hope also to shed some light on an old and difficult problem in the conceptualization of historical and Revolutionary causality.

THE CONTINGENCY THESIS AND EVENT HISTORY

The two-decade-long revisionist turn toward a political and cultural analysis of the French Revolutionary period has placed ever greater emphasis on the contingent nature of the events of 1787–1789. In these accounts, due attention is paid to the financial crisis that culminated in the calling of the Estates General and the breakdown in royal authority. And there is even sometimes a final chapter—as, say, in William Doyle's survey—devoted to the social and economic circumstances which lay behind the popular reaction to the political miscues of high officialdom. In the best of these histories—and I would rank Doyle's or Roger Chartier's among them—the ideological basis of revolutionary conflict is understood through an examination of deep socio-cultural transformations. Yet the revisionist school necessarily depends on a narrative disjuncture. Chartier, quoting approvingly from Daniel Mornet, puts it this way: "The origins of the Revolution are one story, the history of the Revolution is another." Unlike the big-process histories of the Marxist school, the revisionist consensus is that it was an accidental conjunction of unrelated events (a poor harvest, a

fiscal crisis, a vacillating king) that made this particular revolution possible at this particular historical moment.⁴ I have no grievance with multi-causal forms of explanation, and I am sympathetic with the attempt to return human agency to accounts of historical change. But the implications of this conjunction thesis are often left ambiguous. In this paper, I will use a *reductio ad absurdum* argument to clarify its limits.

Implicit in the conjunction thesis is the claim that the volatile situation of the late 1780s need not have precipitated the Revolution. As J. L. Boshier points out in his introduction to Jean Egret's *The French Prerevolution*, a perverse historian could easily make the Revolution appear imminent at almost a dozen moments during the eighteenth century. Egret's book is itself an attempt to make the timing and manner of the Revolution plausible through the use of a dense narrative.⁵ In the past few decades, many historians have unapologetically embraced narrative and the rhetorical arts—and few have done so with more fervor than the revisionist historians of the French Revolution.⁶ To be sure, the leading Revolutionary revisionists were skeptical about the retreat from a history undergirded by social science. Alfred Cobban was unimpressed with the explanatory power of “mere” chronicle. And François Furet, from his camp, refused to forego the assistance of the auxiliary sciences in giving a generalizable account of the Revolution.⁷ But the revisionists' repudiation of the Marxist historiography, and the cultural and linguistic turn of many of their followers, has in some cases led to a return to chronicle, in which the relationship between event and structure goes unexamined. At the limit, such an assumption implies that the Revolution can best be understood as a succession of individual events, a series of singularities.⁸ The problem, as Alan Spitzer recently noted in his review of Simon Schama's *Citizens* (a book proudly subtitled, *A Chronicle*), is that event history offers no escape from the knotty problems of interpretation, in which the historian's selection of particular episodes and the elucidation of their meaning requires a commitment to structures of explanation, as well as (at least implicitly) to claims about real social structures.⁹ The goal of this paper is to inoculate the historiography against any further collapse into narrative, and to suggest how we might better connect the contingency we associate with human agency and narrative history with structural explanations of revolutionary causation.

Of all the events said to have precipitated the French Revolution, none is more famous than the taking of the Bastille, widely understood as the culmination of the battle for Paris that raged in mid-July 1789. William Sewell has recently articulated a far more satisfactory theory of historical events, using the Bastille as his central case study.¹⁰ Sewell notes that an historical event is not simply an instantaneous and localized happening, but a “ramified series of occurrences” which “is recognized as notable by contemporaries,” and which precipitates a “durable transformation of structures.” One of the merits of this approach is its attentiveness both to the way major historical events alter the distribution of material resources (power) and to the way those events are marked out by participants and early commentators as significant. In revisiting the fall of the Bastille, Sewell begins with the deadlock in the National Assembly where two forms of sovereignty were in conflict. On one side, the royalist party supported a monarchy which claimed to rule on the basis of hierarchy, privilege, and deference. On the other side, the patriot party invoked the free choice of equal citizens to formulate their own constitution. It was against this stalemate, he

notes, that the Parisian crowd acted on 12–14 July to repulse the royal troops from Paris and thereby oblige the king to capitulate to the patriot camp. Even so, it was only in the days and weeks following the taking of the Bastille that this event came to be understood as symbolic of this victory. During this period the representatives of the Third Estate gradually assimilated the story of this spontaneous crowd action into a meaningful political episode by carefully distinguishing this action from other, previously suspect crowd actions, whose violence they did not want to endorse. In making this connection, commentators made use of the specific characteristics of the Bastille event: the widespread view of the prison as a bastion of tyranny, the martyrdom of the popular assault, even the ritualized parading of the head of Launay, and—I would add—the prominent role played by the French Guards.¹¹ The resulting amalgam was the basis for a reconceptualized understanding of popular sovereignty and political revolution. Sewell notes that it is also characteristic of such historical events that they give rise to further, otherwise unexpected events: in this case, the Great Fear and the renunciation of legalized privilege on August 4. In short, Sewell's retelling of this familiar tale deepens our appreciation for the way historical events acquire significance in addition to their immediate material impact. My strategy in what follows will be to track backwards in time from this same event—the taking of the Bastille—to see whether we cannot shed light on how local causes relate to both this particular event and to the deeper structures which precipitated the Revolution.

THE DEFECTION OF THE GUARDS

The defection of the Guards has long been seen as integral to the story of the Revolution. The regiment consisted of 25 general staff officers, 198 line officers, 180 NCOs, and 3,342 soldiers. Their main task was to patrol the streets of Paris and back up the police in the event of a major riot. This was a relatively uneventful job in eighteenth-century Paris, except in 1750 when the Guards suppressed a riot, and in the early 1770s when they helped enforce the royal will against the Paris Parlement during the Maupeou crisis. Most of their other duties were ceremonial: posting guard at the opera, marching in processions, attending upon the king at Versailles. But these ceremonial duties were emblematic of royal authority over the city, and as a practical matter, to control these troops was to control Paris.¹²

The July defection of these troops made a difference to the early unfolding of the Revolution in three interrelated ways. First, the contribution of the French Guards had a material impact on the taking of the Bastille. Rather than being an unruly mob action, as is often supposed, the fall of the Bastille actually had something of the character of a military operation. All eyewitness accounts agree that it was the arrival of some sixty guardsmen with their five cannon (and the guardsmen's skill in using those weapons) which brought about a surrender of the fortress which the crowd of civilians had otherwise failed to achieve. The patriots thereby demonstrated that they could put up organized resistance to authority.¹³

Second, the rebellion of the Guards signaled to the royalists that they could not count on the loyalty of government troops and obliged them to call off their attempt to solve the political crisis with military force. This alliance between

some elements of the Guards and the patriot faction was the outcome of a gradual process. The previous year, during the rebellion of the notables (May 1788), the royalists had successfully deployed the Guards—their bayonets affixed—to arrest defiant aristocratic magistrates sheltered in the chamber of the Paris Parlement. And in April 1789, the Guards had obeyed Du Châtelet's orders to fire on the crowd at the Réveillon riots.¹⁴ But only two months later, on June 23, the Guards refused to follow an order to clear the representatives of the Third Estate from the Assembly or to shoot on the crowd which had gathered outside Versailles in the meantime. And within weeks, some guardsmen were to go so far as to raise their arms against troops loyal to the king. During that interval, a counter-revolutionary faction, orchestrated by Broglie and Besenval, had ordered frontier regiments—many of them non-French speaking and including cavalry units—to converge on Paris. On July 12, when these royalist troops were finally positioned on the edges of the city, the royalists persuaded the king to dismiss the popular Minister Necker. When, in response, the patriots roused the city, the cavalry was ordered in. The Guards then acted in concert with the populace to repel the troops from the right bank. Paul Spagnoli has recently shown that the standard accounts of that day have often over-dramatized the famous confrontation between Lambesc's Royal-Allemand and the Guards. However, a group of rebellious Guards did engage a detachment of dragoons on that day. This escalating level of commitment by the Guards demonstrated that the army could not be trusted to carry out royal commands with blind mechanical obedience. This effectively nullified the government's main instrument of coercion and ruled out the use of physical force to bring Paris to heel and intimidate the representatives of the Third Estate.¹⁵

And third, as the objects of an intense propaganda war, the soldiers of the French Guards found themselves caught between two notions of sovereignty. On the one hand, they were being told by their superiors that their oath to serve the king meant that they had a sacred obligation to follow without question the orders of their noble officers. On the other hand, they were being told by the pamphlets of the patriot press that to fire upon their fellow citizens would debase their honor as Frenchmen and violate their conscience as citizens. In other words, the contradiction between the two notions of sovereignty, which Sewell and other historians have identified as the ideological fault-line of the late eighteenth century, had immediate and very practical meaning for soldiers. For nineteenth-century historians of this episode, the outcome of this struggle for the loyalty of the troops was a foregone conclusion because the Guards were essentially part of "the people."¹⁶ For Hippolyte Taine, the Guards took the part of the people because, like them, they were degenerate and violent. For Jules Flammermont, the Guards took the part of the people because, like them, they were virtuous.¹⁷ In fact, as we will see, the Guards were generally not recruited from the people of Paris and were subject to disciplinary pressures distinct from those confronted by civilians. And from the point of view of the citizens of Paris—especially those leaders who claimed to speak for the Third Estate—soldiers were widely mistrusted and generally considered uncouth louts restrained from vice only by the threat of draconian punishment.¹⁸ Hence, the ultimate alliance between the civilian population and a crucial portion of the soldiery—or, to be more precise, the creation of the new personage of the citizen-soldier—was the outcome of the revolutionary process, not its starting point. Commentators closer to the scene understood

this, and explained the breakdown of troop discipline, in part, on transformations within the military. Indeed, it was to illustrate the disastrous effects of these military transformations that royalist journalists, such as Montejoye, blamed Du Châtelet for the desertion of the Guards. "M. Du Châtelet, more struck than any other by this malady of innovation, wanted to change everything, to reform everything in a corps where nothing needed to be done, and where the best action would have been to avoid disrupting the customs it had established."¹⁹ Montejoye's larger assertion was that Du Châtelet's reforms had broken the sacred bonds which tied soldiers to officers, and all military men to the king, bonds that were the sinews of the ancien régime. But what were Du Châtelet's disastrous reforms?

DU CHÂTELET AND THE MILITARY ENLIGHTENMENT

Du Châtelet (1727–93) was the son of the army officer, Lieutenant-General Florent-Claude Du Châtelet, and his wife, the marquise Emilie Du Châtelet. Emilie was a natural philosopher, who along with her lover, Voltaire, helped introduce Newtonian mechanics into France. It seems, however, the boy was legitimate. Voltaire denied reports that he was the child's natural father; although all his life he took a strong paternal interest in the child he claimed he "had seen born." Emilie and her lover took great pains in the education of the youngster. They selected his tutors with care from the practitioners of the new physics, and Emilie wrote her *Institutions physiques* for his instruction. His childhood was passed in Cirey, the country capital of the High Enlightenment, where "Newton was god."²⁰

It was decided, however, that the boy would follow his real father into the army. Yet even there, it was Emilie's wealth and political connections which assisted his career, and the echoes of Enlightenment ideals which guided his activities. In the year 1745, when she was finishing her translation of the *Principia*, she began to lobby her friend, the enlightened Minister of War Argenson, for a regiment on her son's behalf. The boy was then eighteen and recovering from small pox. Three years later, she was forty-two and pregnant, and hoping to secure a still better post for him. His disapproval of her pregnancy led her to wonder if he was as grateful as he ought to be for his allowance and her help.²¹ In fact, that pregnancy killed her, making Du Châtelet a wealthy man and owner of Cirey. His further rise was assisted by his extensive connections among *Les Grands*. Rumors suggested his young wife (a Rochechouart) was the Dauphin's mistress, and that on that basis he had been granted command of the fine Regiment of Navarre in 1753.²² He served as ambassador to Vienna from 1761–68, and ambassador to London from 1768–70, postings he owed to his close friend and compatriot from Lorraine, Etienne-François, duc de Choiseul. Louis XVI made Du Châtelet a hereditary duke in 1777 and gave him command of the Régiment du roi, the most prestigious regiment in the regular army.²³

Du Châtelet belonged to the military reformers of Choiseul's party. In the wake of the humiliating defeats of the Seven Years' War, the aim of these enlightened reformers was to further strengthen the hand of the royalist state in order to achieve new forms of battlefield operations. Prussian successes seemed to flow from

subordination; Frederick the Great's new rapid field tactics depended on strict discipline, flexible tactics, and centralized command. Frederick was the Newton of the battlefields, directing his soldiers according to laws which he also served. In the years 1763–88, military reformers such as Choiseul, Minister of War Saint-Germain, and especially Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte, comte de Guibert, attempted to imitate this model in France. To that end they created a permanent general staff, eliminated several show regiments, phased out the sale of venal military offices, centralized the recruitment of soldiers, and attempted to establish a strict table of ranks for officers using meritocratic modes of promotion. All these changes (which we might group under the rubric of military professionalism) eroded the sense in which army officers could be said to own their troops and instead reinforced bureaucratic obedience to the central command. As I have noted elsewhere, these changes demanded a new level of discipline by both troops and officers, a discipline of body and mind such as Foucault documents in *Discipline and Punish*. In that work, Foucault equates the prison régime which found its fullest expression in the Benthamite panopticon with the mechanisms by which the pedagogues of the Classical Age regulated the activities of their pupils, and by which military reformers of the eighteenth century formed the bodies of their soldier-subordinates. Foucault uses many examples from the Military Enlightenment, especially from Guibert, to show how the goal of these reformers was to extract a kind of obedience that would in time come to seem innate to those who followed its dictates, a coerced version of self-discipline. As I have argued elsewhere, this kind of bodily self-discipline has its correlate in the cognitive self-discipline of the emerging professional classes—including military officers—professionals who inhabit that peculiar panopticon called meritocracy.²⁴

What Foucault fails to note is that this disciplinary program fueled bitter resentment among contemporaries. In the army, its opponents castigated this discipline as German, a term which invoked long-standing stereotypical contrasts between Prussian regimentation and French *élan*. Regimental commanders were particularly angered by restrictions on their ability to promote their favorites. And they pressed their case at court. Periods of reform were punctuated with reversals. With every change of minister the French army was subject to a welter of laws and countermanding laws. The central problem was that these new objective methods of promotion were sharply at odds with the mechanisms of patronage and privilege that had traditionally made for a successful career in the *ancien régime*. As Jay Michael Smith has convincingly shown, the nobility's claim for its privileges was rooted in both birth and service, which were not seen as contradictory. For the aristocracy, a family history of fidelity and heroic actions merited the king's personal recognition and the reward of high office. But in place of this older form of merit, the Military Enlightenment sought to define another kind of merit—more familiar to us today—which relied solely on evaluations of the qualities of the individual officer, as judged by institutional norms. As a practical matter, the rapid increase in the size of the French army had meant that the king could no longer personally recognize the accomplishments of each officer. But in delegating the authority to make these promotions to royal administrators, the state was obliged to turn increasingly to objective measures of worthiness: the number of battle actions or wounds, seniority, and the ability to pass certain kinds of tests. This preserved the king's metaphorical role as regulator of all rank and

precedence in his kingdom, while filling the institutions of the monarchy with dedicated professionals. Minister of War Argenson put it this way at mid-century: "Were everyone the child of his achievements and merits, then justice would be done and the state would be better served."²⁵

These enlightened administrators believed that they were thereby serving the sovereign's interest. But in the long run the new institutional norms had two corrosive effects on the system of privilege and patronage on which the absolutist constitution depended: they threatened to set aside the accident of birth as irrelevant to ability, and they seemed to detach state service from personal loyalty to the king and place it instead in the service of the public good. One expression of this new sense of public service can be seen in the call for an army of citizen-soldiers. Reformers such as Guibert were convinced that citizen-soldiers would act with a degree of self-discipline which would make them invincible on the field. But these reformers also understood how unlikely such an army was under the Bourbons. Therefore, in the place of the self-discipline of virtuous citizen-soldiers, Guibert offered a scientistic program of externally coerced discipline for drilled subject-soldiers.²⁶

Du Châtelet's interventions in this reform process are instructive. From his seat on the prominent Comité Militaire in the early 1780s he tried to cut back on the pay scale for generals, eliminate useless ranks, and reduce the number of show regiments. He favored a divisional structure, and hoped it would end that practice by which "each commander has his own particular regime, [while] the uniformity, so desirable and so neglected in France, is less observed than ever." He was an important advocate of the Ségur Law which, as David Bien has shown, was intended to increase the professionalism of the officer corps.²⁷ All of these were projects of the other Enlightenment—and ruefully acknowledged as such by its stepparents in the High Enlightenment. Answering a correspondent who complained about serving under Colonel Du Châtelet, Voltaire called his "stepson" one of the most estimable men in France, adding that "he has surpassed all my hopes." Voltaire also vouched for his attachment to the progressive camp, noting that "the title of *encyclopédiste* will not do you wrong in the eyes of Colonel Du Châtelet." (In later years, Voltaire even went so far as to concede, however ruefully, that Frederick and Guibert's rationalistic approach to warfare and military organization belonged to the broad current of progress, as much as did advances in the arts and sciences.)²⁸

Thus, it was accounted a considerable victory for the reformers, when upon the death of the commander of the French Guards, the duc de Biron, in 1788, the king turned to the sixty-year-old Du Châtelet. There had been considerable maneuvering at Versailles for the post, which had been held by Biron for forty years and which carried prestige equal to being a marshal of France. The chief contender was Biron's nephew, the duc de Lauzun, a supporter of the Parlement of Paris in the brewing aristocratic revolt against the king. In turning instead to Du Châtelet, the Court was appointing a loyal advocate of royalist centralization to the command of what was, in a sense, the Praetorian guard of the monarchy. Not only was the king again asserting his right to supersede familial claims on high office, he was signaling his intention to make a professional regiment out of these quasi-ceremonial troops, which the former commander Biron had treated as his children.²⁹

STRUCTURAL REFORM AND THE FRENCH GUARDS

In fact, as Jean Chagniot has made clear, reorganization of the Guards had been underway since the Ministries of Choiseul and Saint-Germain. The Guards first reform law, passed in 1764, was of a piece with the contemporary pattern of army professionalization—and of its incomplete nature. From this time forward, the Guards were housed in barracks, rather than among the town-dwellers. At the same time, the recruitment of troops, which had once been the obligation of individual captains, fell to the general staff. This inaugurated a deliberate policy of reducing the percentage of troops of Parisian origin. The goal was to cut the social and economic ties between soldiers and urbanites, so as to improve the troops' reliability as urban police. Nevertheless, professionalization proceeded more slowly among this quasi-ceremonial corps than in the general army, and the Guards still enjoyed many privileges. True, they were no longer allowed to marry. However, they were still allowed to exercise other trades to supplement their pay. They were also provided with a free school for their children. And they had access to their own hospital.³⁰

The NCOs in the Guards were exceptionally capable and accomplished men, and they too enjoyed special privileges. Even after the reforms of 1764 and 1777, they could still marry. Many were men of means and were often able to get their sons appointed as NCOs in the Guards. If they took leave without permission, they were not condemned for desertion. They had the right to retire to the Hôtel des Invalides with the rank of an officer. They even had their own lodge of Franc-Masons recognized in 1788.³¹ The noble officers, too, were caught between a world of privilege and new pressures to abide by a common set of public rules. Even by regular army standards, the young officers in the Guard were disproportionately wealthy and well-connected. What rich young man would not prefer the delights of Paris to a provincial posting? According to captain Thomé, the seductions of the capital were ruining young officers. The general staff officers deplored insubordination among junior officers and their disrespect for the military hierarchy. For his part, Major Agoult felt that too many young officers had fallen under the sway of "the sentiment of equality which in the present century has unfortunately confounded all estates and all ranks." The solution of the leadership was to enhance competition among officers along meritocratic lines. The law of 1764 made rising officers eligible for the first opening in the entire regiment, rather than only in their company. But this meritocratic program, by detaching promotion from the patronage of immediate superiors, ran the risk of severing the ties of mutual obligation among officers, as well as between officers and soldiers.³² The danger here was that the French Guards had duties radically unlike those of provincial troops: policing the streets of a city unique in France and serving at Versailles. Hence, the Guards operated outside the usual chain of command, owned their own extensive properties and hospital, and even ran their own courts of law. In short, the French Guards partook of the particularist constitution which governed the ancien régime—and which was increasingly at odds with the monarchy's attempt to rationalize the army.

THE FINAL ASSAULT ON PRIVILEGE

In 1788, the privileges of both officers and men came under renewed assault. That year, a proposal circulated that would have required two Guards officers per battalion to actually live with the men in barracks for at least eight days at a stretch. Thomé felt that a firm commander would use this measure to “put an end to individual pleasures” and reestablish the “military hierarchy.” The uproar from the officers was immediate. The second-in-command protested that whatever their formal rank, the Guards’ junior officers were not untitled officers of fortune or the leaders of some civilian outfit; as Guards officers, they had certain “distinctions, prerogatives, privileges and rights.”³³ The proposal was never implemented.

Later that year, as part of the royal budget-cutting measures, the crown placed Guibert in charge of a Conseil de Guerre entrusted with a vast overhaul of the nation’s military. Delirious with the hope that his reforms would finally be implemented, Guibert proposed new army-wide methods for promoting officers, new methods of drill, and a resumption of sword-beatings for soldiers. He also entirely eliminated several ceremonial companies. The French Guards were spared this fate, but out of their annual budget of 1.8 million *livres* a year (three times the cost of a comparable infantry regiment), Guibert expected to save a third. He would reduce troop strength by one-fifth, furlough thirty per cent of the officers, and reorganize units. The streets of Paris, he believed, could be policed more cheaply—though he noted that this would have to be done gradually and with some caution.³⁴

Du Châtelet’s interventions in 1788–89 were of a piece of this reform program—pursued without caution. Archival sources reveal that he pried into every aspect of regimental life. He faulted the troops’ parade style, complained about the tarnished buttons on their uniforms, rigorously enforced curfew, broke up their contraband in liquor, and closed their free school. He forced NCOs to conform to contracts typical of the regular army and ended the sergeants’ right to consider themselves sous-lieutenants. He insisted that line officers take regular tours in the barracks and arrogated power over their promotion to the general staff. Troops, NCOs, and officers all protested.³⁵

On 31 May 1789, Du Châtelet privately confessed his feelings to a close friend. By his own admission, he irritated and disgusted everyone: soldiers, NCOs, officers. All he wanted “was to put soldiers under arms and teach them to march at seventy-six paces a minute.” For this, he was being calumniated in all of Paris. He admitted that he had faced the same general outcry twenty years before when he had overhauled the Régiment du roi. To be sure, that had been in a provincial outpost; this was in Paris. Nothing could be done about it now, however. He would simply have to plug his ears for a year or two until the furor subsided. Unpopularity, alas, was the eternal price of drumming out of the army “those who wish to have the title and salary, and yet not serve.” His one concession to the complaints was to agree to postpone until October 1789 his plans for a more rigorous school for officers. “We must first train the trainers. And if this provokes half of them to quit, it will not be of any great loss for the king’s service.”³⁶

THE NEW CLAIMS OF CITIZENSHIP

For the common soldiers and their sergeants, however, these disciplinary restrictions were distinctly at odds with new popular appeals to their identity as Frenchmen. These appeals were conveyed in pamphlets which contrasted the machine-like discipline of the new reformed army with the free assent that was the natural right of French citizens. After the Réveillon riots, pamphlets, ostensibly by a group of guardsmen, begged the people's forgiveness for having fired into the crowd. "No doubt you consider us senseless automatons, obeying by hidden springs the demands of the Machinists." They swore allegiance to the king, but promised they would never again shed the blood of their fellow citizens. Whether these anonymous pamphlets were actually written by guardsmen is by no means certain, but they certainly came to speak for the Guards: the soldiers never again did shoot into the crowd.³⁷ On the day after June 23, when the Guards refused to clear the Assembly or assault the crowd at Versailles, a pamphlet attributed to the grenadiers of the first company of the Guards declared themselves men "of Biron's time" and reiterated their loyalty to the king, but warned "if we're given an order to fire on the people, in the name of the devil, we'll throw down our arms!"³⁸ Another such pamphlet, addressed by a guardsman to Du Châtelet, complained that the colonel had asked them to "know the drill and to fire their muskets mechanically without considering either for whom or against whom. . . . According to your abominable system . . . to be a soldier is to cease to be a good Frenchman, citizen, son . . . and become a slave."³⁹ Another pamphlet by a former guardsman equated the military discipline of the new type (including beating with the flat of a sword) with "German discipline, made less for men than for horses."⁴⁰ Plainly, the mechanical discipline required by the old régime military was increasingly being seen as incompatible with the free choice of citizens.

Ironically, Du Châtelet was probably unique among the French leadership in having had direct experience of mass insurrection in the only European city that could compare with Paris. As ambassador to London during the "Wilkes and Liberty" movement of 1769–70, Du Châtelet had tried to help whip up the insurrection as a way to undermine the British government, only to find his own carriage attacked in the street. During the subsequent suppression of the movement, he had noted with approval that the British troops, under instruction from the London City Council, had mostly contented themselves with a show of force, and held their fire.⁴¹ Yet in Paris in the critical weeks in the summer of 1789 Du Châtelet actually tried to tighten discipline. He quartered his troops in barracks and began to toss them in the *salle de discipline*. One can measure the rising tension within the Guards by tracking the growing number of men he threw into the brig for insubordination and violation of curfew. From a total of twenty in prison in January 1789, the rate grew to three new prisoners per day in early May, to ten per day in early June, and to twenty per day in late June. At this rate a quarter of the regiment was passing through the brig every month.⁴²

This disciplinary program itself became an explicitly political bone of contention at the very end of June and beginning of July 1789. At that time, Du Châtelet had incarcerated a dozen of his recalcitrant soldiers in the prison of the Abbaye de Saint-Germain for having refused to fire on the crowd on June 23. As news

of their imprisonment reached the Palais Royal on the night of June 30, thousands of Parisians headed down to force their release. Some voices in the crowd threatened to take the Bastille; others wanted to burn down Du Châtelet's house; but they contented themselves with bearing the liberated soldiers back to the Palais Royal in triumph. Finally, a deputation was sent to the National Assembly on July 1 to ask for pardon for the soldiers. But the Assembly—in which the duc Du Châtelet sat as a representative of the nobility—decided to be cautious about usurping the king's executive function, especially in his role as guarantor of the public order. Arguing that the populace had interfered with formal justice and the hierarchy of military discipline, the representatives of the nobility rejected any interference by the legislature and only permitted the Assembly to forward the deputation's request to the king. The next day, the king reluctantly pardoned the soldiers.⁴³

The net effect of this crucial episode was to seal an implicit pact between the patriots and the soldiers. Henceforth, the soldiers were to forebear from firing on the people, and in return the people would protect the soldiers from the consequences of their disobedience. Popular justice replaced military command. The set of disciplinary pressures that made the soldier an instrument of state rule collapsed, and in its place the soldier was free to recognize himself as one of the people. We can see this transformation celebrated in patriot pamphlets, such as this one, dedicated to the Guards, which touts their freely given self-control as a sign of their nascent citizenship, and sees in the Guards' refusal to follow orders the consummation of the new ideal of the citizen-soldier. "But to vanquish oneself, for simple machines, automaton, to become men, to show themselves to be citizens without giving up the title of soldier, to combine the two extremes, to bear the brow of liberty under the livery of slavery, is to rise above all."⁴⁴

From that point on, the Guards were lost to the king. On the morning of July 14, a troop of Guards helped a crowd pillage muskets and cannon from the store rooms at the Invalides. Despite Du Châtelet's personal intervention, the crowd made off with a substantial cache of arms. The Colonel himself was threatened, and some of his soldiers were obliged to intercede so he might flee to Versailles with his life.⁴⁵ That afternoon, a contingent of Guards, 61-strong, joined the besiegers at the gates of the Bastille and provided them with the five crucial cannon which enabled them to take the fortress. Among that 61, I have located 14 soldiers who had been incarcerated by their Colonel in the previous two months alone.⁴⁶ The Colonel resigned his command two days later, and on that same day Lafayette took charge of the nascent National Guards, a quasi-military force composed of Parisian civilians. Thereafter, the French Guards ceased to fulfill their function as the Parisian police.⁴⁷

CONCLUSION: CONTINGENCY AND STRUCTURE

What does it mean to assert—as Sénac de Meilhan and other royal apologists did—that Du Châtelet "caused" the French Revolution? Himself a former intendant of recent nobility, Sénac de Meilhan admitted that the old aristocrats had known far better how to lead men. In comparing Du Châtelet to his predecessor, the "imposing and chivalrous" Marshal Biron, Sénac de Meilhan noted that the new colonel

lacked the visible signs of authority and instead tried to govern by mechanical regulation. "A man whose exterior had nothing imposing about it, [and] who had earned the ill-will of his troops by his maniacal [*minucieuse*] frugality, by his much misplaced severity, [and] by his absolute principle of uniformity which did not allow him to distinguish those differences that time, place, or persons demanded in practice and which merited respect [because of] long custom."⁴⁸

For Sénac de Meilhan, then, the accusation against Du Châtelet was part of a larger assertion about the failures of heavy-handed Enlightenment top-down reform. The nobility of the ancien régime was not despotic, he argued, but commanded with paternal benevolence. They ruled magnanimously, taking note of individual circumstances and particularities. By contrast, the reformers' rationalist principle of uniformity and efficiency ignored human diversity and the contingencies of daily life; it exercised power without respect for the local traditions which bound men and women to a comprehensive social order. In this critique, the blame for the Revolution lay with those reformers within the ancien régime who had run roughshod over social customs and distinctions. This critique drew heavily on Montesquieu's attacks on the leveling rationalism advocated by the philosophes (and which appealed only to those of mediocre minds). Sénac de Meilhan had a particular animus against Minister of War Saint-Germain, famous for his attempt to professionalize the officer corps and for authorizing the beating of soldiers with the flat of the blade. In the damning dichotomy of the day, these reformers had tried to discipline (valiant) Frenchmen as if they were (servile) Germans. Du Châtelet's failed attempt to impose this discipline was a prime example of the disastrous consequences of this program of Enlightened (Prussian) discipline.⁴⁹

This sort of analysis is surely not a fully satisfying explanation for the rupture of July 1789, nor of revolutionary causation in general. But it does have the virtue of placing personal and institutional loyalty at the center of the revolutionary narrative. Any narrative of revolution certainly needs to recount the collapse of military coercion as a perceived and actual prop of the authority of the ancien régime. This does not mean that historians can collapse explanations into chronicle however. To be sure, there is no way to refute the counter-factual claim that had the violent battle for control of the capital in July turned out differently, the course of the Revolution would have been altered. Nor is it possible to disprove (or prove) the contention advanced by several contemporaries that had Biron rather than Du Châtelet been in command of the Guards, the city would not have been lost for the king.⁵⁰ To my mind, the value of dramatizing the rebellion of the French Guards does not lie in this sort of analysis. What mattered to contemporaries—and to us—is that the Guards' defection made visible otherwise hidden fault-lines in the authority of the ancien régime. In this sense, Du Châtelet is a plausibly representative figure, one whose life intersects with well-known and dramatic events which have otherwise acquired significance (in Sewell's sense) as markers of historical change. In this paper, I have used the accidents that frame Du Châtelet's life to narrate a plausible story about the transition from the old régime to the new. In this narrative due attention is paid to the specific circumstances of Du Châtelet's interventions and their immediate impact, but these circumstances have been primarily used to cast light on the larger, structural contradictions of Enlightenment reform, and how these set the scene for a notable historical event.

Scholars seeking to understand the relationship between the Enlightenment and the Revolution have faced two major difficulties. First, they have had to explain the thirty-year gap between the high tide of the *philosophes* and the outburst of the Revolution. Second, they have needed to explain how scribblers could inspire a vast social and political transformation, which itself unleashed twenty years of the sort of reaction and carnage they deplored. To fill this lacuna, Robert Darnton has posited a successor-generation of underground Grub Street critics who violently denounced the institutions of the ancien régime in terms their Enlightenment forebears would never have countenanced. And recently other historians—Sarah Maza in particular—have broadened this thesis, pointing to an emerging public sphere in which a critical appraisal of absolutist justice became coupled with a critique of ancien régime social mores. There is much to commend this thesis. But the monarchy was not simply pushed over from outside; the ancien régime state fell apart from within, as significant portions of its main source of physical coercion refused obedience.⁵¹

Here, a different successor-generation of the *philosophes* played a role. As Tocqueville long ago noted, the administrators of absolutism found unwitting allies among those thinkers who elevated Reason to the position of “sole despot of the universe.” So that when the *philosophes* trained their fire on privilege, they simply handed the authorities a new rationale for further centralization—even while holding those same authorities to an impossible standard. Equal taxes, standard weights and measures, and routine public administration were all long desired by the monarchy. So too was the analogous demand for meritocratic promotion and hierarchical discipline in the army. Though Tocqueville concentrates exclusively on the centralization of civil administration, his analysis applies brilliantly to the ancien régime military.⁵²

As we have seen, the reform of the Guards (and the disaffection of its troops and officers) did not begin with Du Châtelet’s arrival. Rather, that disaffection developed out of a long-standing attempt by reformers to make both officers and soldiers more reliable by making their discipline more uniform and exacting. Into this program, stepped Colonel Du Châtelet, a military reformer of the other Enlightenment, the kind of man characterized by Foucault as an obsessive manipulator of detail. In his hands, the Enlightenment celebration of reason became just another rationale to centralize authority and tighten discipline. One unexpected effect of this program was to break down the personal ties that bound and ranked officers and men. In this sense, the Enlightenment of Voltaire gave birth to the Revolution, not only through his gift of rational criticism, but also by way of popular rebellion against his rationalizing stepson.⁵³

NOTES

I wish to thank the reviewers and editors of this journal.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes: B.N.=Bibliothèque National, Paris; A.N.=Archives Nationales, Paris; S.H.A.T.=Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre, Vincennes.

1. *Christophe-Félix-Louis Ventre de la Touloubre de Montejoye, L’ami du roi . . . Histoire de la Révolution de France* (Paris, 1791), “June 1789,” 2:131.

2. Arthur Young, *Travels in France during the Years 1787, 1788, and 1789*, ed. Constantine Maxwell (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1950), 157. B.N. Fr Mss 6687 Siméon Hardy, "Mes loisirs," 25 June 1789, 8:365. Jefferson to Jay, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson*, ed. Julian P. Boyd (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950–), 15:184–91. Gabriel Sénac de Meilhan, *Du gouvernement, des moeurs, et des conditions en France avant la Révolution* (Hamburg: Gottlob-Hoffmann, 1795), 205; see Comte d'Allonville, *Mémoires secrets de 1770 à 1830* (Paris: Werdet, 1838), 2:119.

3. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage, 1979), 168–69.

4. William Doyle, *Origins of the French Revolution*, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1988). Roger Chartier, *Cultural Origins of the French Revolution*, trans. Lydia Cochrane (Durham: Duke Univ. Press, 1991), 8.

5. J. L. Bosher, introduction to Jean Egret, *The French Prerevolution*, trans. Wesley D. Camp (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977), vii–xix.

6. For an early discussion of the resurrection of narrative, see Lawrence Stone, "The Revival of Narrative: Reflections on a New Old History," *Past and Present* 85 (1979): 3–24; also, Allan Megill, "Recounting the Past: 'Description,' Explanation, and Narrative in Historiography," *American Historical Review* 94 (1989): 627–53. For particular attention to the revisionist historians of the French Revolution and to the way cultural historians have begun to mine stories from the past, see Sarah Maza, "Stories in History: Cultural Narratives in Recent Works in European History," *American Historical Review* 101 (1996): 1493–1515.

7. Alfred Cobban, *The Social Interpretation of the French Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1964), 1–7. François Furet, "From Narrative History to Problem-oriented History," *In the Workshop of History*, trans. Jonathan Mandelbaum (1975; reprint, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1984), 54–67.

8. While I am not aware of any historian of the French Revolution who has yet done so, some scholars have gone so far as to claim that history, rather than marching in Newtonian fashion, with large-scale processes unfolding in a predictable manner, might best be understood as unfolding in a chaotic fashion, with small local perturbations ("events") initiating radically disparate outcomes. In the infamous example: a butterfly beating its wings in China dramatically alters the weather over Chicago a week later. For a popular account of chaos science, see James Gleick, *Chaos: Making a New Science* (New York: Viking, 1987). For a post-modern view of how chaos theory might supplant linear narratives, see Katherine Hayles, *Orderly Disorder in Contemporary Science and Literature* (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1990). For two attempts by philosophers to get historians to pay chaos theory its due, see George Reisch, "Chaos, History, and Narrative," *History and Theory* 30 (1991): 1–20; and Donald McCloskey "History, Differential Equations, and the Problem of Narration," *ibid.*, 21–36. But this analogy from a mathematical theory is highly suspect. We have no evidence that the social world follows the highly structured unfolding described by chaos theory. And in any case, chaos theory can not be used to track backwards from large-scale events to single causative butterflies. There are many butterflies in China, and many of them are flapping their wings much of the time. See Paul A. Roth and Thomas A. Ryckman, "Chaos, Clio, and Scientistic Illusions of Understanding," *History and Theory* 34 (1995): 30–44.

9. Simon Schama, *Citizens: A Chronicle of the French Revolution* (New York: Knopf, 1989). Alan B. Spitzer, "Narrative's Problems: The Case of Simon Schama," *Journal of Modern History* 65 (1993): 176–92.

10. William H. Sewell, Jr., "Political Events as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille," *Theory and Society* 25 (1996): 841–81.

11. See the positive accounts of the Guards by Dusaulx, one of the commissioners on the Comité de la Bastille, in Jean Dusaulx, *De l'insurrection parisienne* (Paris: Debure, 1790), 9, 31.

12. Pierre-Victor Besenval, *Mémoires* (Paris: Baudouin, 1821), 2:358. Jean Chagniot, "Le problème du maintien de l'ordre à Paris au XVIIIe siècle," *Société d'histoire moderne* 8 (1975): 32–45.

13. Perhaps the most reliable account of that day is by [Louis Abel Beffroy de Reigny], *Précis exact de la prise de la Bastille* ([Paris, 14 July 1789]). See also L.-G. Pitra's version in Jules Flammarion, ed., *La journée du 14 juillet 1789* (Paris: Société de l'histoire de la Révolution française, 1892), 4, 25, 27. The

best secondary account is by Jacques Godechot, *The Taking of the Bastille*, trans. Jean Stewart (London: Faber and Faber, 1970). See also Georges Rudé, *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1959), 53–60; and Georges Lefebvre, *The Coming of the French Revolution*, trans. R. R. Palmer (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1967), 113–16.

14. See the account by an ex-officer in the Guards, Antoine-Charles-Marie-Anne de Tardieu de Maleissye, *Mémoires d'un officier aux gardes françaises (1789–1793)* (Paris: Plon, 1897), 7–8. Anon., *Histoire du siège du palais par le capitaine d'Agoult à la tête de six compagnies de gardes-françaises* (n.p., [May 1788]). Egret, *The French Prerevolution*, 147–48, 154. A.N. BB30 87 Du Châtelet to Cosne (Lt.-gen. de police), 28 April 1789. In a cross-examination before the Revolutionary police, Du Châtelet later denied that he had given the order to shoot. A.N. W301 #10 [Revolutionary tribunal], “Du Châtelet,” [1793]. For an eyewitness account of the Réveillon riot, see Jean-Henri Hassenfratz to Sylvestre-François Lacroix, 28 April 1789 in *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 28 (1956): 72–73. Godechot, *Bastille*, 136–51.

15. Pierre Caron, “La tentative de contre-révolution de juin-juillet 1789,” *Revue d'histoire moderne* (1906–1907): 5–34, 649–78. For a participant accounts, see: M. Civras, “Pierre Bardin, soldat aux gardes-françaises,” 25 July 1789, *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* 1 (1924): 464–65; Lt. Deflues, “Précis de ce qui est arrivé au Régiment de Salis-Samadé pendant la campagne de 1789,” in Godechot, *Bastille*, 288–92; and Maleissye, *Mémoires*, 45–54. Paul G. Spagnoli, “The Revolution Begins: Lambesc's Charge, 12 July 1789,” *French Historical Studies* 17 (1991): 466–97.

16. Typical is the sentiment of the nineteenth-century military historian of the unit, Noël Lacolle, *Les gardes françaises: Leur histoire, 1563–1789* (Paris: Charles-Lavauzelles, [1901]), 309–16.

17. Hippolyte Taine, *Les origines de la France contemporaine: La Révolution* (Paris: Hachette, 1878), 1:49. Jules Flammermont, “Les gardes françaises en juillet 1789,” *La Révolution française* 36 (1899): 12–24.

18. On the negative image of the soldier at the end of the ancien régime, see Jean Chagniot, *Paris et l'armée au XVIII^e siècle: Etude politique et sociale* (Paris: Economica, 1985), 611–45. Also, Hans Speier, “ Militarism in the Eighteenth Century,” *Social Research* 3 (1936): 304–36.

19. Montejoye, *L'ami du roi*, “June 1789,” 2:132.

20. In fact, Voltaire met Emilie in the summer of 1733, and her son had been born on 20 November 1727. There are no scholarly studies of F.-L.-M. Du Châtelet, except for that of Lestopis, which focuses on his last ignominious days when he tried to bribe his way out of trouble with the Revolutionary authorities. A. de Lestopis, “Un grand corrupteur: Le duc Du Châtelet,” *Annales historiques de la Révolution française* (1953), 25:104–26, 316–39; 27:5–26. Voltaire to Marie Louise Denis, 22 July 1769, Voltaire to Jean-François Dufour, 16/17 November 1770, Voltaire to Jean Baptiste Nicolas de Lisle, 2 October 1774, *Voltaire's Correspondence*, ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1953–1965), 72:170–71; 77:95; 89:36–37. Emilie Du Châtelet to Nicolas-Claude Theirot, 23 December 1737, Emilie to Johann Bernoulli, April 1739, 30 May 1744, *Lettres de la marquise Du Châtelet*, ed. Theodore Besterman (Geneva: Institut et Musée Voltaire, 1958), 1:202; 1:362–63; 2:116–17.

21. Voltaire to René-Louis de Voyer, marquis d'Argenson, 29 April 1745, Emilie Du Châtelet to François Jacquier, 12 November 1745, Emilie to Argenson, 2 March 1748, Emilie to marquise de Bouffleurs-Remiencourt, 3 May 1749, *Voltaire's Correspondence*, 14:126; 14:262; 16:19–20; 17:69.

22. Charles Philippe d'Albert, duc de Luynes, *Mémoires* (Paris: Firmin-Didot, 1863), 11:467, 13:67.

23. On Du Châtelet's friendship with Choiseul, see Etienne-François, duc de Choiseul, *Mémoires* (Chanteloup: Buisson, [1778], 1790), 1:245–69; 2:1–119.

24. Ken Alder, *Engineering the Revolution: Arms and Enlightenment in France, 1763–1815* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1997). Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 135–56.

25. Jay Michael Smith, *The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600–1789* (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Press, 1996). Argenson quoted in Guy Chaussinand-Nogaret et al., *Histoire des élites en France du XVI^e au XX^e siècle: L'honneur, le mérite, l'argent* (Paris: Tallandier, 1991), 232–33. Claude-Louis de Saint-Germain, *Mémoires* (Switzerland: Libraires Associés, 1779), 3–40.

26. Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert, *Essai général de tactique*, in *Oeuvres militaires* (Paris: Magimel, [1771], 1803), 1:15–16.
27. S.H.A.T. Bib. MS 174 Du Châtelet, “Comité Militaire” 1782, 2: 102–13. David Bien, “The Army in the French Enlightenment: Reform, Reaction, and Revolution,” *Past and Present* 85 (1979): 68–98.
28. Voltaire to Jean-François Dufour, 8 January 1768, 16/17 November 1770, *Voltaire’s Correspondence*, 68:24; 77:95. On Voltaire and Guibert, see “La tactique,” in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Garnier, [1773], 1877), 10: 187–94. Also Christiane Mervaud, *Voltaire et Frédéric II: Une dramaturgie des lumières, 1736–1778*, in *Studies on Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century* 234 (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1985).
29. Ironically, Du Châtelet, the opponent of the sale of venal offices, paid a hefty charge of 500,000 *livres* for the post. A.N. E1677A, no. 7 “Arrêté du Conseil d’Etat,” 3 January 1790. For Lauzan’s fit of pique, see Pierre-Gaston, duc de Lévis, *Souvenirs-Portraits* (Paris: Mercure de France, [1815], 1993), 187–203; also, Egret, *Prerevolution*, 284; Maleissye, *Mémoires*, 9.
30. Jean Chagniot, *Paris et l’armée. Ordonnance du roi concernant le Régiment des Gardes-françaises*, 29 January 1764 and 17 July 1777. Samuel Scott, *The Response of the Royal Army to the French Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1978), 53–54. S.H.A.T. Ya271 “Etat des élèves,” 20 October 1782.
31. S.H.A.T. Ya271 “Etat de sergents,” [1788]. Ya271 No title, 14 February 1789, 7 June 1789. Otto Karmin, “Une loge de gardes-françaises à la veille de la Révolution,” *Revue historique de la Révolution française et de l’Empire* 4 (1913): 308–9.
32. S.H.A.T. Ya269 Thomé, “Mémoire,” 18 August 1788. Agoult, “Analyse,” [1788].
33. S.H.A.T. Ya269 Manzicourt, “Mémoire,” [1788]. Mathan, “Mémoire,” 22 April 1788.
34. S.H.A.T. MR1790 Guibert, “Mémoire concernant les gardes françaises,” [1788]. Egret, *Prerevolution*, 47–54. Matti Lauerma, *Jacques-Antoine-Hippolyte de Guibert, 1743–1790* (Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1989), 183–211.
35. S.H.A.T. Ya272 “Ordre, garde auprès du roi,” 13 June 1789. Ya273 “Registre,” 14 February 1789. Ya273 Du Châtelet to Boullage, “Correspondance générale de la garde-française,” 14 February 1789. Even his friend, the baron de Besenval would later complain that Du Châtelet was “a little persnickety about details, having completely changed [the troops’] regimen and introduced many innovations.” Besenval, *Mémoires*, 2:351. His “absurd innovations” were roundly denounced by his regimental officers; see: Jean-Louis-Marie Dugas de Bois-Saint-Just, *Paris, Versailles, et les provinces au 18e siècle* (Paris: Normant, 1809), 2:293–300; and Maleissye, *Mémoires*, 10–11, 20, 39.
36. Zürich Staatsarchiv; Nachlass des Anton von Salis Marschlins: Du Châtelet to baron de Salis, 31 May 1789.
37. B.N. Lb39 7553 Anon., *Apologue des gardes-françaises* [Paris, April 1789].
38. B.N. Lb39 7314 Anon., *Arrêté des grenadiers aux gardes-françaises* (Paris, 24 June 1789).
39. B.N. Lb39 1868 Anon. *Lettre d’un grenadier des gardes-françaises au duc Du Châtelet* [Paris, 1789]. This pamphlet does show considerable knowledge of the internal details of the Guardsmen’s activities.
40. B.N. Lb39 1867 Anon., *Avis aux grenadiers et soldats du tiers état par un ancien camarade du régiment des gardes-françaises* (Paris, 25 June 1789). This pamphlet was being distributed among soldiers by Jean-Claude Monnet when he was arrested on 8 July 1789; see Scott, *Response of the Royal Army*, 56.
41. Ambassador to London, Du Châtelet, writing home, noted that “If there were to be a revolution, it would be much more disastrous than any previous, and would cause a dissolution of all those powers which govern the people. But that is almost impossible so long as the King retains his influence over the legislature and is not forced, by the open revolt of the people, to dissolve it.” Du Châtelet to Versailles, 9 March 1770, in *Recueil des instructions données aux ambassadeurs et ministres de France* (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1965), 25:455. On Wilkes, see George Rudé, *Wilkes and Liberty: A Social Study of 1763 to 1774* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962).
42. S.H.A.T. Ya272 “Etat de soldats,” January-July 1789.

43. B.N. Lb39 1883 Marie de Saint-Ursin, et al., *Récit de l'élargissement forcé* (Paris, 1789). B.N. Lb39 1888 Anon., *Adresse des gardes-françaises enlevées des prisons* (Paris, 2 July 1789). B.N. Lb39 7351 Anon., *La grâce des gardes-françaises* ([Paris], 6 July 1789). B.N. Lb39 1822 Anon., *Relation de ce qui s'est passé à l'Abbaye de Saint-Germain* (Paris, 1 July 1789). For the acrimonious legislative debate, see *Archives parlementaires* (Paris, 1879–), 1 July 1789, 8:175–78.

44. A.N. Lb39 7346 Anon., *Le triomphe de la raison, à MM. les gardes-françaises* (Paris, 1789).

45. B.N. Lb39 2005 Anon., *Le grenadier patriote* (Paris: Garnéry, 1789), 13. See also, Jean-Sylvain Bailly and Duvynier, *Procès-verbal des séances et délibérations de l'Assemblée Générale des Electeurs de Paris* (Paris: Baudoin, 1790), 1:267–68.

46. [Reigny], *Précis*, includes a list of the Guards present. For the lists of prisoners, see S.H.A.T. Ya272 "Etat de soldat," May-July 1789.

47. On his resignation, see B.N. Lb40 1425 J. B. Dulac, et al., *Extrait de délibération prise dans l'Assemblée Générale de District*, 21 July 1789. In January 1790 Du Châtelet repocketed the venal charge of 500,000 livres; see A.N. E1677A, no. 7 "Arrêté du Conseil d'Etat," 3 January 1790. On the formation of the National Guard, see Dale Lothrop Clifford, "The National Guard and the Parisian Community, 1789–1790," *French Historical Studies* 16 (1990): 849–78. For the ultimate fate of Du Châtelet, guillotined in 1793 for bribery and as an émigré, see B.N. Lb41 2232* [Du Châtelet], *Jugement rendu*, 10 March 1793 (Paris: Imprimerie du Tribunal-Criminel-Révolutionnaire, [1793]). Also Lestopis, "Un grand corrupteur."

48. Sénac de Meilhan, *Gouvernement*, 203–5.

49. See also Sénac de Meilhan's earlier statement, *Des principes et des causes de la Révolution en France* (London, 1790). On Sénac de Meilhan, see Jacques Godechot, *The Counter-Revolution: Doctrines and Action, 1789–1804*, trans. Salvator Attanasio (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), 137–40. For another critique in the same vein, see Lévis, *Souvenirs-Portraits*, 201. Charles de Secondat de Montesquieu, *Esprit des lois*, in *Oeuvres complètes* (Paris: Garnier, 1875), 5:412–13.

50. Maleissye, *Mémoires*, 9, 25–26.

51. The classic work that attempts to bridge the "generation" gap is Daniel Mornet, *Les origines intellectuelles de la Révolution française* (Paris: Colin, 1933). Robert Darnton, *The Literary Underground of the Old Regime* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1982). Sarah Maza, *Private Lives and Public Affairs: The Causes Célèbres of Prerevolutionary France* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1994).

52. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Régime and the French Revolution*, trans. Stuart Gilbert (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1955). For a broad extension of Tocqueville's analysis to the European military in this period, see David Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1990), 203–37.

53. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 139–41.